Abstract-Three novel blind watermarking techniques are proposed to embed watermarks into digital images for different purposes. The watermarks are designed to be decoded or detected without the original images. The first one, called single watermark embedding (SWE), is used to embed a watermark bit sequence into digital images using two secret keys. The second technique, called multiple watermark embedding (MWE), extends SWE to embed multiple watermarks simultaneously in the same watermark space while minimizing the watermark (distortion) energy. The third technique, called iterative watermark embedding (IWE), embeds watermarks into JPEG-compressed images. The iterative approach of IWE can prevent the potential removal of a watermark in the JPEG recompression process. Experimental results show that embedded watermarks using the proposed techniques can give good image quality and are robust in varying degree to JPEG compression, low-pass filtering, noise contamination, and print-and-scan.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N RECENT years, watermarking has been an exciting topic and there have been many watermarking schemes proposed. Among these schemes, those requiring both the original data and the secret keys for the watermark bit decoding are called private watermark schemes. Those requiring the secret keys but not the original data are called public or blind watermark schemes [2] . Those requiring the secret keys and the watermark bit sequence are called semi-private or semi-blind watermark schemes [3] . Usually, the robustness of private watermark schemes is good under signal processing procedures such as JPEG compression and filtering. However, private schemes are not feasible in situations such as watermark detection in DVD players, because the original data is not available. Blind watermark schemes, on the other hand, detect the watermarks without the original data and are feasible in those situations. The trade-off is that the blind schemes are usually less robust and have relatively higher false alarm rate compared with the private schemes. This paper is about blind watermarking schemes.
There are many existing private schemes for robust watermarking. Cox et al. [1] uses spread spectrum to embed watermark in the discrete cosine transform (DCT) domain. To improve Cox's method, Lu et al. [4] uses cocktail watermark to Hartung [8] and Arena et al. [22] use spread spectrum to embed watermarks in I-frames, P-frames or B-frames of MPEG-2 compressed video. Essentially, the coding and watermarking of I-frame is the same as that of JPEG. One problem of embedding watermarks in JPEG-compressed images is that the watermarked images need to be JPEG compatible. This implies that all DCT coefficients need to be re-quantized with the same quantization factor after the watermark insertion. The typically small-magnitude watermark can be completely removed in the re-quantization. No existing methods address this problem explicitly.
In this paper, we propose three blind watermarking techniques to embed watermarks in a watermark space. The first proposed technique, called single watermark embedding (SWE), uses two secret keys to embed a meaningful binary logo image in the watermark space, using the spread spectrum technique and some novel features. It does not require the watermark to be orthogonal to the original data, thus allowing bit sequence embedding even in small images. Based on SWE, the second proposed technique, called multiple watermark embedding (MWE), is developed to embed multiple watermarks simultaneously in the same watermark space. Different secret keys are used for different watermarks. We propose solutions for the special case when the secret keys are orthogonal and for the general case when the secret keys are correlated. We show that correlated secret keys can be better than orthogonal keys. The third proposed technique, called iterative watermark embedding (IWE), embeds a single watermark in a JPEG-compressed image to produce another JPEG-compressed image. A novel iterative approach is used to ensure explicitly the existence of the watermark after re-quantization process.
The paper is organized as follows. The proposed SWE and MWE are introduced in Sections II and III, respectively. The proposed IWE is introduced in Section IV. Experimental results and discussions are given in Section V.
II. SWE
In this section, we propose a SWE scheme to embed a single watermark in an image. SWE can be applied in transform domains such as DCT, and possibly the spatial domain, of an image. We group some selected image pixels or transform coefficients to form a vector and call it the watermark host vector. Let the watermark host vector be with length . The watermark with is a bit sequence with length , where . The bit sequence may be a meaningful image such as the logo of the image owner or the information related to the host images such as the owner's name, image ID, , etc. We modulate the watermark by a bit-wise logical XOR operation with a pseudorandom bit sequence with to give the modulated watermark sequence with . In the rest of the paper, we will simply use to represent the modulated watermark.
To embed the watermark, we divide the host vector into subvectors of equal length , with the subvector denoted as . Each subvector is used to embed one bit of watermark information. SWE uses two keys to embed into the host vector to form the watermarked vector . The first key, denoted as , is a set of pseudorandom positive real numbers. The second key is with each being zero-mean Gaussian with variance . Both keys are needed to decode or detect the modulated watermark. Similar to the host vector , we split both and into subvectors of equal length , with the subvector denoted as and , respectively. Fig. 1 shows the two-dimensional plane spanned by and . We segment the axis of (or subspace spanned by ) into disjoint cells of width , and assign the cells alternately to "1" and "0". The watermark bit is embedded by adding a small deviation in the direction of (1) where for case 1 for case 2 for case 3 (2) where , %, and are rounding, modulo 2 and -norm respectively, and is the inner product of and . In case 1, the projection of onto the -axis falls in a cell of the desired watermark bit. In cases 2 and 3, the projection falls in a wrong cell. In case 2, the cell on the right is closer. In case 3, the cell on the left is closer. We force the projection of to be at the center of the nearest cell of the desired watermark bit. The nearest cell would ensure minimal distortion to the image. The center of the cell would give maximum robustness because the distance to the nearest cell boundary is maximum at the center of a cell. It would take a distortion of at least in the direction of to incur an error in the decoded bit. In this sense, the cell width controls the robustness of the embedded watermark bit. However, a large may lead to visible artifacts as the distortion due to watermarking is larger than in cases 2 and 3. To decode the watermark bits for SWE, we extract the watermark vector from the test image and segment it into subvectors of length . The modulated watermark bit is decoded from the subvector as using the two keys and the demodulated watermark bit is obtained as . To detect whether a modulated watermark is present in a testing image, we decode all the bits of watermark from the image as and evaluate a score. A possible score is the traditional normalized cross correlation between the original watermark and the decoded watermark (3) Each watermark bit is transformed from to in (3). When SWE is applied in the transform domain, another possible score is the weighted normalized cross correlation score (4) where . We choose relatively large for the watermark bits embedded in the low-frequency components of the image and smaller for the high frequency components, because the decoded bits in the low-frequency components tend to be more trustworthy. Attacks (intentional or unintentional) on low-frequency components tend to be less severe than in high frequency because distortions in the low-frequency components tend to be more visible. If the detection score is higher than a pre-defined threshold, the watermark is considered to be present in the testing image. Note that the use of the weighting factor does not affect the embedding process.
III. MWE
In this section, we generalize SWE to embed multiple watermarks in the same image while retaining high image quality. In SWE, we embed only one bit in each subvector. In MWE, we embed bits simultaneously in each subvector . We generalize the first key to sets of pseudorandom positive real numbers denoted as and the second key to pseudorandom vectors of length , denoted as with , for . Similar to SWE, we split the host vector and the random vectors into subvectors of length . The element of is denoted as and the subvector of is denoted as . The bit of the watermark sequence is denoted as . The watermarked subvector, denoted as , is (5) The scaling factors form a row vector with . The goal of the watermark embedding process is to derive a set of scaling factors (or vector ) which satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that the projection of onto the direction of corresponds to the correct watermark bit as
The second condition is that the distortion or the Euclidean distance between and is minimized. The Euclidean distance is also the energy of the watermark and is equal to 
Substituting (5) into (6), simultaneous equations can be obtained. They are, in matrix form (9) with (10) where is an integer for any , . If all the are determined, the row vector can be computed using (10) and the scaling vector can then be obtained as from (9) . It is important to choose the integers such that the is as small as possible. By substituting (9) into (7), the can be rewritten in terms of and as (11) We will now propose two approaches to choose the . The first approach is called the direct approach (DA), which is simple and is optimal for the special case of orthogonal random key vectors. The second approach is called iterative approach (IA), which is more suitable for the general case of nonorthogonal random key vectors. The second approach is useful because nonorthogonal random vectors can potentially 
A. The DA
In our DA, is chosen according to (12) to minimize the absolute value of , as shown in (12) , at the bottom of the page. It is easy to show that (12) guarantees all are integers. The advantage of using DA is its simplicity. And this is the optimal solution for the special case of orthogonal random key vectors. It is not optimal in the general case of nonorthogonal key vectors. 
B. The IA
Here is the iterative approach. Expanding (11), can be written as a second-order function of (13) where is the element of matrix . The trivial solution achieves minimum . However, these values are invalid as they are not in the form of (10) . We need to find a valid in the form of (10), where all are integers, such that is minimized. In the proposed IA, we maintain a pool of valid candidate vectors for and will allow the size of the pool to grow as the iterations proceed. The algorithm starts with a vector pool with only one valid vector obtained from the DA. In each iteration, each valid vector in the pool will be optimized by an algorithm to be described later to yield some new valid vectors. If any new valid vector is not already in the valid candidate vector pool, it will be added to it for the next iteration. The is computed for all the vectors in the pool and the minimum is identified. The iterations will stop when the incremental reduction of the minimum is less than a threshold. Here is the two-stage optimization done in each iteration. In the first stage, consider any valid vector in the vector pool. A set of vectors is produced from by optimizing some elements in while keeping the others unchanged. Let the number of elements to be optimized be . Since there are ways to choose elements from (of length ), there are optimized vectors produced from each vector after the first stage. We find experimentally that or are good values for . Let be the set of the index of the elements selected from . Then can be written as (14) Differentiating with respect to each element of and setting the derivatives to be zero, we get simultaneous equations (15) Since is a quadratic function and positive definite, attains its minimum when (15) is satisfied. By solving (15) , one optimal vector of is obtained. Typically, the optimal vectors produced in the first stage are not valid since they are not in the form of (10) with integer . The second stage is now applied to modify these optimal vectors to produce valid suboptimal vectors. Consider a particular optimal vector . Our problem is that the corresponding computed from (10) (16) is not an integer. We use two methods to convert it into an integer. The first is to simply round to the nearest integer. We call this IA-rounding or IA-R in short. The second way is to include all the combinations of floor and ceiling, for . This will produce suboptimal valid vectors. We call this IA-full or IA-F in short. The pool size should grow faster in IA-F than IA-R.
C. Watermark Decoding and Detection
Although multiple watermarks are embedded in the host signal simultaneously in MWE, each embedded watermark bit sequence can be decoded independently, as in SWE. Watermark detection is performed in a similar way by decoding the watermark bit sequence and computing the scores or in Section II-A.
IV. IWE IN JPEG-COMPRESSED DOMAIN V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We tested the proposed algorithms on many testing images as shown in Fig. 4 . All the images are 512 512 pixels (e.g., see Fig. 5 ) and only the luminance components are used. Six 44 30 binary logo images, as shown in Fig. 6 , are used as perceptual meaningful watermarks in the experiments. The binary images are raster-scanned to form 1-dimensional bit sequences and modulated with a pseudorandom binary sequence. We simulate SWE and MWE in the DCT domain. The whole original image is transformed to the (512 512) DCT domain and scanned in a zigzag order. We use the first 10% of the DCT AC coefficients to form the host vector to embed the watermark. The length of the host vector is . The length of the watermark is . The length of the subvector is . We choose low-frequency components of DCT to form the host vector as these components tend to have large energies such that the embedded watermarks tend to be robust against different kinds of attack.
For the score in (4), we choose the weighting factor as follows. The default 8 8 quantization matrix in JPEG is bilinear interpolated to 512 512. Treating this as an image, we extract the host vector of length and divide them into subvectors of length . The weighting factor is chosen as the inverse of the sum of elements of the subvector such that the low-frequency components have relatively large .
A. Results of SWE
The proposed SWE is used to embed the "UST" logo in all the testing images. A typical SWE-watermarked image is shown in Fig. 7 . With very high PSNR, the watermarked images have very good visual quality. As expected, all the watermark bits can be decoded perfectly under no attack resulting in both detection scores and being 1. Several unintentional attacks are simulated, including JPEG compression, low-pass filtering (LPF), noise, and print-and-scan. In the JPEG compression attack, the watermarked images are JPEG compressed with the default quantization matrix scaled by various scaling factor (SF) to achieve different compression ratio. Most research papers control the JPEG quality using the quality factor (QF) and the SF is related to the QF by (17) JPEG decompression is performed followed by watermark detection. Ten trials with different keys and are performed for each SF to obtain the average detection scores. The first key is a vector of 1320 random numbers generated independently from a Gaussian distribution with and . The other key is generated from a Gaussian distribution with and . These parameters are chosen to achieve a PSNR of about 45 dB for the watermarked images. We observe that at such PSNR, the watermarked images are almost indistinguishable from the original image to the human eyes.
The typical average detection scores, and , are shown in Fig. 8 . We observe that, in most cases, is larger than . This agrees with our finding in the Appendix that the expected value of is larger than that of , in the case that takes on only two values, a larger one for the bits with low probability of error and vice versa. Perhaps can be as good as, if not better than, for watermark detection. The sample distribution of in SWE watermark detection are shown in Figs. 9, 11, and 13 for JPEG attack, LPF, and noise attack, respectively. There are two types of detection errors for a given detection threshold: type 1 being the false positive error and type 2 being the false negative error. The total detection errors (sum of type 1 and type 2 error probability) against different thresholds are shown in Figs. 10, 12 , and 14 respectively. All curves are averages of 100 trials with different keys.
Six situations of JPEG compression attack with 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 on the SWE-watermarked images are shown in Fig. 9 , together with the reference "no watermark" situation. The sample distribution of "no watermark" does not intersect with any of the sample distributions of the six JPEG situations. As a result, any threshold values in the "in-between" region in Fig. 10 can give zero total detection error. A typical example of SWE under JPEG attack is shown in Fig. 15 . At (0.319 bpp) with a PSNR of 32.23 dB, the JPEG-compressed image has rather severe and visible image distortion due to JPEG compression. The severe compression attack causes the decoded watermark (the 44 30 binary logo) to be noisy with a bit error rate of 25.08%. Although the decoded 'UST' logo is barely visible, the detection scores remain quite large at and . The watermark can be clearly distinguished in the random watermark test in Fig. 15 . Similarly, the sample distributions of "watermarked" and "no watermark" under LPF attack do not intersect in Fig. 11 , and thus there are many thresholds in Fig. 12 that can give zero detection error. A 3 3 averaging filter (with coefficients of 1/9) is used in the LPF. A typical example of SWE under LPF attack is shown in Fig. 16 . The LPF attacked image is blurred with a PSNR of 31.85 dB. The LPF attack causes the decoded watermark to be somewhat noisy with a bit error rate of 14.62%. Although the "'UST" logo is visibly noisy, the detection scores remain large at and . The watermark is clearly distinguishable in the random watermark test.
Six situations of Gaussian noise attack with different noise variance (Var) are shown in Fig. 13 , together with the 'no watermark' situation. Again, the nonintersection of 'no watermark' and other sample distributions lead to the possibility of zero detection error in Fig. 14. A typical example of SWE under Gaussian noise attack is shown in Fig. 17 . The image attacked by an additive zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance 225 is noisy with a PSNR of only 24.26 dB. The severe noise causes the decoded watermark to be very noisy with a bit error rate of 32.35%. Although the "UST" logo can hardly be recognized and the detection scores are low at and , the watermark is still distinguishable in the random watermark test.
In the print-and-scan attack, the watermarked images are printed at 180 dpi (2.84 inch 2.84 inch) on photo papers using a 2880dpi Epson 895 printer. They are then scanned with a 2400 dpi Epson 1250 scanner resulting in images with approximately 7000 7000 pixels. Software (e.g., Photoshop) is used to rotate manually the scanned images to an upright position, to crop out the image regions and to resample them down to 512 512 images using bi-cubic interpolation. A typical example of the print-and-scan attack is shown in Fig. 18 . The resampled image at a PSNR of 24.79 dB looks quite good. The low PSNR suggests that the manual rotation and cropping might have led to misalignment. The print-and-scan attack causes the decoded watermark to be very noisy with a bit error rate of 22.95%. Although the "UST" logo is noisy, the detection scores are quite large at and . The watermark is distinguishable in the random watermark test results. In this case, is larger than . In attacks such as cropping, vector quantization, rotation, scaling, SWE may not be robust. 
B. Results of MWE
The proposed DA, IA-R and IA-F for MWE are used to embed the "UST" logo in Lena. The average PSNR of the wa- termarked images are shown in Fig. 19 against , the number of simultaneously embedded watermark bit sequences. All the values are averaged over ten trials with different random keys. The simulation is done with both orthogonal random subvectors and nonorthogonal subvectors. The curves marked DA, IA-R, and IA-F correspond to the nonorthogonal cases. The curve marked ORV corresponds to DA in the orthogonal case. In the orthogonal case, both IA-F and IA-R degenerate into DA because DA is the optimal solution. The keys are generated from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 250 and a variance of 4. The other keys are generated from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 16. As in SWE, these values are chosen in an ad-hoc way to achieve a PSNR of about 45 dB for watermarked images when . In Fig. 19 , regardless of the algorithm, the watermarked images have very high PSNR and very good visual quality when only one watermark is embedded. When more watermarks are embedded simultaneously, the PSNR of the watermarked images decrease with . In the nonorthogonal cases, the PSNR of IA-R and IA-F are similar, both being significantly higher than that of the low-complexity DA. This verifies that DA is nonoptimal in the nonorthogonal cases, and both the IA-R and IA-F can improve over DA significantly. The results also verify that it is possible to achieve higher PSNR in the nonorthogonal cases (by IA-R and IA-F) than in the orthogonal cases.
Here is a comparison of IA-F and IA-R in terms of PSNR, complexity and robustness. Theoretically, IA-F should always have higher PSNR than IA-R, but Fig. 19 suggests that their PSNR difference is insignificant. Their complexity are shown in Fig. 20 in terms of the average number of distinct vectors in the valid candidate vector pool. They have similar complexity for up to five watermarks , beyond which IA-F becomes significantly more complex than IA-R. In the Matlab 6.5 implementation on a Pentium 4 1.4-GHz PC, the average CPU time for IA-R and IA-F with is 17.11 and 59.61 s, respectively.
As expected, all the watermark bits can be decoded perfectly under no attack resulting in both detection scores and being 1. The average detection score of MWE with five watermarks embedded under JPEG-compression attack is shown in Fig. 21 against the JPEG scaling factor (SF). The of IA-F, IA-R, and DA are very similar at any SF. Considering the PSNR, complexity and performance under attacks, it appears that IA-R gives better quality-complexity-robustness tradeoff than IA-F.
Here are more robustness results of IA-R. The five binary logos in Fig. 6 In the JPEG attack on MWE in Fig. 23 , unlike the case of SWE, the distribution of "no watermark" intersects with the distribution corresponding to . As a result, no threshold can give zero detection error probability at in Fig. 24 . A typical example of MWE under JPEG attack ( , zero error) is shown in Fig. 29 . Similar observations can be made for the LPF attack on MWE in Figs. 25, 26 , and 30. With five watermarks embedded, the sample distributions of "watermarked" and "no watermark" are intersecting slightly. Error can occur in some cases. An example of MWE with no error is shown in Fig. 30 . In the noise attack on MWE in Fig. 27 , the distribution of "no watermark" intersects with many distributions and thus no zero detection error is possible in the corresponding situations in Fig. 28. Fig. 31 is an example of MWE when no error occurs. Fig. 32 is an example of the MWE under print-and-scan attack. Comparing these with the SWE results, it appears that more embedded watermarks tend to result in lower robustness.
C. Results for IWE in JPEG-Compressed Domain
The proposed IWE is simulated for the special situation when the original image is a JPEG image and the watermarked image is JPEG-compressed (with same parameters as original) to form a JPEG image. IWE is simulated with similar setup as in SWE to embed the "UST" logo. The results are shown in Figs. 33-35 . Comparing Figs. 8 and 33 , the proposed IWE can achieve significantly higher detection scores than SWE alone. In Fig. 33 , of IWE starts to be less than one (bit errors start to occur) at SF greater than 1. With only limited number of iterations (1000 in our experiments) allowed, IWE may be unable embed a watermark bit in a bad situation. With increasingly severe compression, there are growing amount of such bad situations. Comparing the PSNR of "watermarked" and "no watermark", the visual quality of IWE remains good, with a drop of about 0.5 dB in PSNR. Two typical images are found in Figs. 42 and 43 , showing the images before and after IWE. Fig. 35 shows that the complexity of IWE can be very large when SF is large. corresponding total detection errors against different detection thresholds are shown in Figs. 37, 39, and 41. In these simulations, the original image is a JPEG image compressed at (as shown in Fig. 42 ) and the watermarked image using IWE is also a JPEG image compressed at (as shown in Fig. 43 ). JPEG attack is now a transcoding attack or JPEG recompression at a different SF. In the three attacks, the sample distribution of "no watermark" does not intersect with the other distributions and thus zero detection error can be achieved. Although the decoded logo may be noisy, the watermark is clearly distinguishable in the random watermark detection test. Typical examples of the three attacks and the print-and-scan attacks are shown in Figs. 44-47.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose three novel blind watermarking schemes to embed watermarks into digital images. The watermarks are designed to be decoded or detected without the original images. The SWE can embed one watermark bit sequence. The MWE can use correlated keys to embed multiple watermark bit sequences simultaneously such that individual watermark bit sequence can be decoded or detected independently. The IWE can embed watermark in a JPEG file and ensure it is detectable. Experimental results show that the three proposed watermarking algorithms give watermarked images with good visual quality. The embedded watermark is robust in varying degrees to unintentional attacks such as JPEG compression, transcoding, LPF, additive noise, and print-and-scan. 
